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The Public Use Clause and
Heightened Rational Basis Review
LYNN E. BLAIS
In their lead essay for this volume, Wesley Horton and Levesque
persuasively demonstrate that the United States Supreme Court’s decision
in Kelo v. City of New London was neither novel nor wrong. They then
suggest that Kelo’s detractors drop their continued crusade to overturn
that decision and shift their focus from challenging the use of eminent
domain for private economic development plans to challenging eminent
domain abuse in general. To that end, Horton and Leveque offer the
provocative proposal that the Court adopt a ten-factor heightened rational
basis test to apply to all condemnations. Using this test, they argue, courts
can invalidate ill-advised exercises of eminent domain while upholding
condemnations that truly serve a public purpose.
I agree with Horton and Levesque’s defense of Kelo. That decision
clearly follows from the Court’s prior precedent and correctly implements
the Public Use Clause. In this Essay, however, I challenge the wisdom of
Horton and Levesque’s proposal to subject all condemnations to
heightened rational basis review under their ten-factor test. This proposal,
I argue, finds no support in existing doctrine and invites widespread
judicial intrusion into the legislative domain in a manner that is neither
authorized nor well-advised.
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The Public Use Clause and
Heightened Rational Basis Review
LYNN E. BLAIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Wesley Horton and Brendon Levesque’s essay provides an interesting
reflection on their litigation and oral argument strategy in Kelo v. City of
New London1 ten years after it was decided, as well as an apt analysis of
the opinion and a provocative prescription for moving Kelo forward.2 In
Kelo, the United States Supreme Court rejected property owners’ Public
Use Clause challenge to the city’s condemnation of their homes as part of a
comprehensive economic redevelopment plan, holding that the Public Use
Clause permits only minimal judicial oversight of legislative decisions to
exercise the power of eminent domain.3 In particular, the Court reaffirmed
its long-standing holdings that public use is a broad concept encompassing
all uses that serve a public purpose, and that courts should “afford[]
legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use
of the takings power.”4 In the first part of their essay, Horton and Levesque
convincingly demonstrate that the decision in Kelo is not an aberration but
rather a straightforward application of settled takings principles.5 In the
second part of the paper, Horton and Levesque suggest that Kelo opponents
abandon their attempts to carve out bright line rules to constrain the
exercise of eminent domain and instead build on Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in Kelo to develop a multi-factored test for determining when
a proposed exercise of eminent domain would serve a public purpose and
when it would not.6
Horton and Levesque’s first point—that Kelo is consistent with the
Court’s prior precedent and was correctly decided—is well taken. Horton
and Levesque persuasively show that the Kelo decision is a logical
Professor Blais is a Co-Director of the Supreme Court Clinic and the Leroy G. Denman, Jr.
Regents Professor in Real Property Law at the University of Texas School of Law. She thanks the
editors of the Connecticut Law Review for publishing this interesting collection of essays, and for their
careful and helpful editing work on her essay.
1
545 U.S. 469 (2005).
2
Wesley W. Horton & Brendon P. Levesque, Kelo Is Not Dred Scott, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1405
(2016).
3
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487–88.
4
Id. at 483.
5
Horton & Levesque, supra note 2, at 1408.
6
Id. at 1426.
*
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outgrowth of the Court’s most well-known Public Use Clause decisions,
Berman v. Parker7 and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,8 as well as
cases that preceded those.9 Moreover, Horton and Levesque artfully
explore four instrumental concepts—precedent, federalism, compensation,
and democracy—that confirm the wisdom of the Court’s determination in
Kelo that the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment is not an absolute
bar to the exercise of eminent domain for economic development.10
Horton and Levesque’s next point—that Public Use Clause challenges
should be resolved by applying a ten-factor balancing test to proposed
condemnations—is less persuasive. Horton and Levesque assert that
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Kelo provides a road map for “look[ing]
more carefully at all condemnations . . . to see whether they qualify as a
public use.”11 According to the authors, the bright-line rules proposed by
Kelo opponents and rejected by the Kelo majority are both over-broad and
under-inclusive.12 For example, a rule prohibiting only condemnations that
transfer private property to a private developer for economic development
would “automatically delineate[] a public road or a bridge to nowhere as a
public use, and automatically delineate[] private economic development as
not.”13 In contrast, Horton and Levesque claim that a new “rational-basiswith-a-bite”14 test built on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence “may possibly
kill a publicly owned and operated boondoggle (such as, perhaps, a sports
stadium) [but] [i]t may also save a privately owned development plan that
a judge finds has a reasonable chance to succeed in reviving a dying
city.”15 To determine whether a proposed use of eminent domain passes
constitutional muster under the Public Use Clause, Horton and Levesque
propose the following ten-factor test:
(1) Will a public body own or operate the property? (2) How
specific is the stated use? (3) Is it reasonably possible the
stated use will actually succeed? (4) Is the stated use clearly a
pretext? (5) Does the public gain outweigh any private gain?
(6) Is there clearly improper favoritism? (7) Is there clearly
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
467 U.S. 229 (1984).
9
See Horton & Levesque, supra note 2, at 1414–16 (“There is quite a large body of law on how
far governments can go in regulating the use of private property before it becomes an inverse
condemnation.”).
10
Id. at 1414, 1418.
11
Id. at 1426.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. Although Horton and Levesque use the phrase “rational-basis-with-a-bite,” other scholars
more commonly refer to it as “rational basis with bite.” I prefer the more descriptive “heightened
rational basis review,” and will use that phrase throughout this piece.
15
Id.
7
8
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improper targeting of a disfavored group? (8) Is the particular
property in question on the periphery of the project? (9) Is
there a comprehensive plan that any private developer must
follow? (10) Were any private beneficiaries known at the
time of the vote to condemn?16
In this response, I address the prescriptive portion of Horton and
Levesque’s essay. Although I applaud their efforts to move property rights
proponents away from their crusade for bright-line rules, I do not endorse
their proposal to apply heightened rational basis review to Public Use
Clause challenges as the best path forward. I take issue with Horton and
Levesque’s proposal for several reasons. First, Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in Kelo neither suggests nor supports such an intensive multifactored inquiry into the merits of every eminent domain plan challenged
under the public use clause. Second, the case on which Horton and
Levesque seek to base their expanded heightened rational basis test—City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.17—also does not support the
broad application of that level of scrutiny to every condemnation. Third,
the Supreme Court has already rejected the use of heightened rational basis
review for other Takings Clause challenges, and its reasoning in those
cases applies with equal force to the Public Use Clause context. Finally,
even if Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and Cleburne Living Center could
be read to support the heightened scrutiny proposed by Horton and
Levesque, and even if the Court had not already rejected the use of
heightened rational basis review for Takings Clause challenges, the
Supreme Court and lower courts should decline to embrace it now. The
Fifth Amendment should not be interpreted to deputize federal courts to
engage in the sort of pervasive, undisciplined review of the merits of
democratically adopted eminent domain plans that the ten-factor test would
entail. Federal courts are neither authorized nor well suited to engage in
such an intensive merits-driven inquiry. Ultimately, Horton and
Levesque’s proposed Public Use Clause test would enlist federal courts in
oversight of democratic decision-making that they are neither justified in
undertaking nor competent to perform.
II. JUSTICE KENNEDY’S CONCURRENCE IN KELO
Horton and Levesque recommend that opponents of the Kelo decision
stop advocating for a bright-line rule that they claim does not line up well
with the merits of eminent domain decisions and instead advance a
heightened rational basis review standard that will ask courts to distinguish
good eminent domain decisions from bad ones, upholding the good and
16
17

Id. at 1426–27.
473 U.S. 432 (1985).

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

1502

[Vol. 48:1497

invalidating the bad. Horton and Levesque identify the seeds of their
proposed heightened rational basis review in Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in Kelo.19
However, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Kelo neither suggests nor
supports the multi-factored test proposed by Horton and Levesque. Horton
and Levesque concede that “Justice Kennedy’s test . . . is not well
developed in his concurring opinion.”20 That, of course, is because the
heightened rational basis review endorsed by Horton and Levesque is not
Justice Kennedy’s test at all. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Kelo was
concerned with the possibility of pretext, not with the substantive merit of
every eminent domain decision, and he proposed more searching scrutiny
of a local government’s decision to use eminent domain only if there was
credible evidence that the proffered “public use” was a pretext for a project
that was “intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental
or pretextual public benefits.”21
That Justice Kennedy was not proposing that all exercises of eminent
domain be subject to a blanket heightened rational basis test is clear from
his concurrence. He begins by reiterating the deferential rational basis test
adopted by the majority, and then explains that he writes separately only to
clarify that the deferential standard of review “does not . . . alter the fact
that transfers intended to confer benefits on particular, favored private
entities, and with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, are
forbidden by the Public Use Clause.”22 According to Justice Kennedy, only
if “confronted with a plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism to
private parties” should a court “review the record to see if [the accusation]
has merit.”23 Even then, Justice Kennedy emphasizes that the court should
review the record “with the presumption that the government’s actions
were reasonable and intended to serve a public purpose.”24
Perhaps Horton and Levesque’s proposal is meant to build on Justice
Kennedy’s concession that there may be “a more narrowly drawn category
of takings” for which a more stringent standard of review might be
appropriate.25 If so, it not only goes much farther than Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence contemplated, it distorts the focus of Justice Kennedy’s
concern. Justice Kennedy never suggested that a more stringent standard of
review should apply to all eminent domain decisions. Rather, he posited
the possible appropriateness of a more stringent standard only in the
18

Horton & Levesque, supra note 2, at 1425–26.
Id. at 1426.
20
Id.
21
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S 469, 491 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
22
Id. at 490.
23
Id. at 491.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 493.
18
19
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context of eminent domain involving private transfers, and even then only
to those “categories of cases in which the [private] transfers are so
suspicious, or the procedures employed so prone to abuse, or the purported
benefits are so trivial or implausible, that courts should presume an
impermissible private purpose.”26 Thus, Justice Kennedy’s suggestion that
a more stringent standard of review might be appropriate in some cases
cannot support Horton and Levesque’s proposal that the Court adopt
heightened rational basis review for every exercise of eminent domain. As
is widely understood, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence was addressed to the
particular problem of pretext,27 not the broader concerns of overreaching
and bad judgments in the exercse of eminent domain that underlie the
continuing opposition to Kelo.
III. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER AND THE PURPOSE OF HEIGHTENED
RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW
Horton and Levesque bolster their suggestion that Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence was “implicitly promoting the rational-basis-with-a-bite test”
by pointing to the opinion’s citation to Cleburne Living Center.28 This
claim distorts the central point of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, in part
because it is clear that he was invoking Cleburne Living Center for a
different reason, and in greater part because Cleburne Living Center itself
did not adopt the generalized heightened rational basis review that Horton
and Levesque advocate.
In his concurrence in Kelo, Justice Kennedy cited Cleburne Living
Center for the unexceptional proposition that “a court applying rationalbasis review under the Equal Protection Clause must strike down a
government classification that is clearly intended to injure a particular class
of private parties, with only incidental or pretextual public justifications.” 29
This reference provides the equal protection corollary of his Public Use
Clause point—that “[a] court applying rational-basis review under the
Public Use Clause should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is
intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or
pretextual public benefits.”30 Neither the Equal Protection Clause nor the
Public Use Clause formulation referred to by Justice Kennedy invokes
judicial review of the general merits of all government decisions. Rather,
Id.
I have explored the difficulties entailed in attempting to ferret out pretext in the exercise of
eminent domain in an earlier article. See Lynn E. Blais, The Problem with Pretext, 38 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 963, 974 (2011) (discussing how the concept of pretext is inadequate to inform the public use
requirement of the eminent domain analysis).
28
Horton & Levesque, supra note 2, at 1418.
29
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
30
Id.
26
27
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under both formulations heightened rational basis review is reserved for
the special circumstance where a particular class is singled out for harm in
a suspicious way, or where a particular party is singled out for a suspicious
benefit. Moreover, even in those limited circumstances, the court’s role is
circumscribed. A court is authorized to look more closely only upon a
“clear showing” of special harm or special benefit, and in its close analysis
to look only for evidence of pretextual or incidental public purpose or
benefit.31 Horton and Levesque’s proposal to expand this limited
heightened rational basis review to a sweeping assessment of the merits of
every condemnation decision would upend the traditional role of courts
and local governments and interject courts too deeply into traditional
governmental decision making.
Horton and Levesque’s argument that Cleburne Living Center adopted
a generalized heightened rational basis test that should be imported into the
Public Use Clause inquiry appears to be based on a misapprehension of
Cleburne Living Center.32 In that case, the Court invalidated a city zoning
ordinance that required a special use permit for the construction of
“[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded” as it applied to Cleburne
Living Center’s proposal to operate a group home for individuals with
intellectual disabilities.33 In so doing, the Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s
holding that individuals with intellectual disabilities are a “quasi-suspect”
class and that the ordinance should therefore be subject to heightened
scrutiny.34 Instead, the Court claimed to apply rational basis review but
nonetheless struck down the ordinance as applied to the proposed group
home.35 After carefully evaluating all of the proffered justifications for
treating group homes for the intellectually disabled differently from, for
example, apartment houses, nursing homes, and fraternity or sorority
houses, the Court invalidated the ordinance because “the record does not
reveal any rational basis for believing that the [group home] would pose
any special threat to the city’s legitimate interests”36 and therefore
“requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational
prejudice against the mentally retarded.”37
To be fair, Horton and Levesque are not the only commentators to
interpret Cleburne Living Center as adopting a generalized heightened
rational basis test. After all, the Court expressly rejected the Fifth Circuit’s
invocation of strict scrutiny yet carefully examined and rejected all of the
Id.
Horton & Levesque, supra note 2, at 1418.
33
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 432, 436, 450 (1985).
34
Id. at 442–45.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 448.
37
Id. at 450.
31
32

2016]

THE PUBLIC USE CLAUSE AND HEIGHTENED RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW

1505

reasons offered by the city in support of its zoning ordinance. In fact,
Justice Marshall’s dissent in Cleburne Living Center takes the majority to
task for obfuscating its analysis by disclaiming the applicability of
heightened review while actually engaging in it.38 Soon after the opinion
was handed down, scholars began to characterize the Court’s analysis as
“rational basis with bite.”39
But the general heightened rational basis review interpretation of
Cleburne Living Center has not endured, neither among scholars nor in the
Court.40 Indeed, Justice Marshall’s dissent was the first analysis of the
Cleburne Living Center opinion to provide a more nuanced description of
the majority’s analysis. As the dissent made clear, the majority was
disingenuous in claiming that it was not engaged in heightened scrutiny,
and this obfuscation left lower courts with “no principled foundation for
determining when more searching inquiry is to be invoked.”41 So Justice
Marshall sought to fill that void by suggesting that “the level of scrutiny
employed in an equal protection case should vary with ‘the constitutional
and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the
recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular
classification is drawn.’”42 In this case, he argued, the establishment of a
home is of particular social importance, and the intellectually disabled
“have been subject to a ‘lengthy and tragic history’ of segregation and
discrimination that can only be called grotesque.”43 Accordingly, he
concluded that given “the importance of the interest at stake and the history
of discrimination the retarded have suffered, the Equal Protection Clause
requires us to do more than review the distinctions drawn by Cleburne’s
38
See id. at 458 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]the Court’s heightened-scrutiny discussion is even
more puzzling given that Cleburne’s ordinance is invalidated only after being subjected to precisely the
sort of probing inquiry associated with heightened scrutiny.”).
39
See, e.g., Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any
Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 779–80 (1987) (noting that “[m]any commentators have suggested that
these opinions represent an effort by the Court to put more ‘teeth’ in the rational basis test”). The
concept of rational basis with bite was first introduced into the scholarly lexicon by Gerald Gunther.
See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1972) (arguing that the Court should put “consistent
new bite into the old equal protection” by declining to “supply justifying rationales by exercising its
imagination”).
40
See, e.g., Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the
1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 373–82 (1999) (arguing that Gerald
Gunther’s theory that the Court developed a new “rational basis with bite” standard had not stood the
test of time); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 899 (2012)
(“But as subsequent commentators noted, the ‘rational basis with bite’ standard did not have much in
the way of legs.”).
41
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42
Id.
43
Id. at 461 (quoting University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.)).
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zoning ordinance as if they appeared in a taxing statute or in economic or
commercial legislation.”44 The majority, he asserted, had applied
heightened rational basis review as a result of an essential trigger (the
importance of the issue at stake) to determine whether an impermissible
purpose (discrimination against a disadvantaged group) was the true
purpose of the legislation.
This “trigger-purpose” formulation of the Court’s use of heightened
rational basis review has emerged as the enduring interpretation among
scholars and within the Court. For example, in 2015 Raphael HoloszycPimentel analyzed every Supreme Court decision invalidating an ordinance
under rational basis review and concluded that this heightened rational
basis review is most often applied to laws that classify on the basis of an
immutable characteristic or that burden a significant right.45 Similarly,
Susannah Pollvogt has argued convincingly that the Court’s “real concern
in many of these [rational basis with bite] cases was with ends and not
means––that insufficient tailoring was merely symptomatic of an improper
purpose: animus.”46 Thus, in its heightened rational basis review cases, the
Court’s scrutiny is triggered by a legislative classification that raises a
realistic concern that the object of the legislative action is impermissible,
not that the action is somehow not closely enough tailored to a permissible
legislative goal.
The Supreme Court has expressly affirmed the “trigger-purpose”
theory of heightened rational basis review, explaining that it employs more
searching rational basis scrutiny when a challenged law is based on
classifications that are “so seldom relevant to the achievement of any
legitimate state interest that the laws grounded in such considerations are
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy.”47 As Justice O’Connor noted in

Id. at 464.
Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, Reconciling Rational-Basis Review: When Does Rational Basis
Bite?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2072, 2105 (2015).
46
See Pollvogt, supra note 40, at 899–900 (recasting the “rational basis with bite” cases as
instances of heightened scrutiny aimed at ferreting out unconstitutional animus); see also Ashutosh
Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 327 (1997) (citations
omitted) (“Recently, however, the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence—especially in the areas of equal
protection and free speech—has revealed a renewed attention to the legitimacy of governmental
purposes, including some consideration of how legitimacy is to be determined by the judiciary. In the
equal protection context, starting with the 1973 Moreno decision, and continuing with Cleburne in
1985 and Romer v. Evans this past Term, the Court has struck down non-suspect legislative
classifications on the grounds that the legislative purpose of ‘harm[ing] a politically unpopular group’
is incompatible with the Equal Protection Clause.”); Farrell, supra note 40, at 411–15 (concluding that
at least five of the ten “rational basis with bite” cases in the Court between 1971 and 1999 are more
properly classified as impermissible purpose cases); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124
HARV. L. REV. 747, 763 (2011) (“Rational basis with bite depends on the idea that governmental
‘animus’ alone is never enough to sustain legislation.”).
47
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440).
44

45
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Lawrence v. Texas, “[w]hen a law exhibits such a desire to harm a
politically unpopular group, [the Court has] applied a more searching form
of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal
Protection Clause.”49
It is to this animus-based heightened rational basis review that Justice
Kennedy alluded in Kelo. His concurrence was not a call to subject all
eminent domain decisions to “rational basis with a bite” review, as Horton
and Levesque suggest.50 Rather, his concurrence reiterated the Court’s
long-held view that certain legislative goals are not constitutionally
permissible, regardless of the closeness of fit between the means and the
ends.51 In the context of the Public Use Clause the constitutionally
impermissible legislative goal is purely private benefit—Justice Kennedy
wrote separately in Kelo to emphasize that the exercise of eminent domain
must be struck down if the condemnation was in fact undertaken solely to
confer a private benefit and the public benefit that was offered to justify it
was merely pretextual or incidental.52
48

IV. HEIGHTENED RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW AND THE PUBLIC USE CLAUSE
Perhaps the most damning critique of Horton and Levesque’s proposal
to adopt a heightened rational basis test for all eminent domain decisions is
that it would require overturning years of Supreme Court precedent. For
more than 100 years, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected the use
of a generalized heightened rational basis review in the Public Use Clause
context, including in Kelo itself.53 The Court in Kelo made clear that
heightened rational basis review had no place in Public Use Clause
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
50
Horton & Levesque, supra note 2, at 1418.
51
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
52
Id. at 490–491.
53
Of course, the Court has imported heightened scrutiny into takings cases in the context of
exactions, requiring that a condition on a land use permit have an essential nexus to the reason for
which the permit could have been denied and rough proportionality with the projected impact of the
permitted use. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389–90 (1994) (adopting a “reasonable
relationship” test whereby the proposed land use requirement must have a reasonable relationship or
nexus to the use to which the property is being made); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S.
825, 836–37 (1987) (determining that a condition on land use designed to further a given purpose
cannot be sustained within a state’s police powers if the essential nexus between the prohibition and the
stated purpose is eliminated). In doing so, the Court made clear that the essential nexus/rough
proportionality inquiry was not heightened rational basis review, and, in fact, expressly declined to call
its new heightened scrutiny by a term that might be confused with rational basis review. See Dolan, 512
U.S. at 391 (“We think the ‘reasonable relationship’ test adopted by a majority of the state courts is
closer to the federal constitutional norm than either of those previously discussed. But we do not adopt
it as such, partly because the term ‘reasonable relationship’ seems confusingly similar to the term
‘rational basis’ which describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
48
49
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challenges when it said, “[f]or more than a century, our public use
jurisprudence has wisely eschewed . . . intrusive scrutiny in favor of
affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs
justify the use of the takings power.”54 Justice Kennedy both joined that
decision and reiterated the point in his concurrence, stating “[t]his Court
has declared that a taking should be upheld as consistent with the Public
Use Clause . . . as long as it is ‘rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose.’”55 This emphatic embrace of deferential rational basis review is
consistent with the Court’s prior Public Use Clause cases.56
Moreover, in a case decided the same term as Kelo, the Court finally
eliminated the specter of heightened rational basis review in regulatory
takings cases, for many of the same reasons it has consistently rejected that
level of scrutiny in Public Use Clause cases.57 In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc.,58 the Court rejected Chevron’s regulatory takings challenge to a
Hawaii statute limiting the amount of rent that an oil company could
charge a lessee service station.59 Chevron based its challenge on the
Court’s oft-repeated statement that “government regulation of private
property ‘effects a taking if [such regulation] does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests . . . .’”60 Although the Court had never
decided a regulatory takings case using this “substantially advance[d]
legitimate state[-]interests” standard, the phrase had been repeated so often
in its decisions that it had “been read [by lower courts] to announce a
stand-alone regulatory takings test.”61 The Lingle Court put an end to that
misadventure, holding that “this formula prescribes an inquiry in the nature
of a due process, not a takings, test, and . . . it has no proper place in our
takings jurisprudence.”62 In particular, the Lingle Court explained that its
regulatory takings jurisprudence was intended to identify those regulations
54
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483. In light of this statement, Horton and Levesques’ claim that the majority
did not embrace very deferential rational basis review in Kelo is inexplicable. See Horton & Levesque,
supra note 2, at 1427 (“the ‘anything goes’ rational basis test was not repeated”).
55
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
56
See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (“[W]here the exercise of
the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never
held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26, 32 (1954) (“We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known as the police power . .
. . The role of the judiciary in determining whether that power is being exercised for a public purpose is
an extremely narrow one.”).
57
See Lee Anne Fennell, Picturing Takings, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 77 n.60 (2012)
(explaining that the Court rejected “the possibility of any elevated means-ends analysis in the
regulatory takings context”).
58
544 U.S. 528 (2005).
59
Id. at 532.
60
Id. at 531 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)) (bracketed language in
original).
61
Id. at 540.
62
Id.
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that “forc[e] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”63 Thus, the
Court explained, regulatory takings tests look to the magnitude and
distribution of the burdens of land use regulation, not to their relative
effectiveness.64 As the Court further explained:
The owner of a property subject to a regulation that
effectively serves a legitimate state interest may be just as
singled out and just as burdened as the owner of a property
subject to an ineffective regulation. It would make little sense
to say that the second owner has suffered a taking while the
first has not. Likewise, an ineffective regulation may not
significantly burden property rights at all, and it may
distribute any burden broadly and evenly among property
owners. The notion that such a regulation nevertheless
“takes” private property for public use merely by virtue of its
ineffectiveness or foolishness is untenable.65
The Lingle Court rejected heightened rational basis review for
regulatory takings challenges not only because it is “doctrinally
untenable,”66 but also because “it would require courts to scrutinize the
efficacy of a vast array of state and federal regulations—a task for which
courts are not well suited. Moreover, it would empower—and might often
require—courts to substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected
legislatures and expert agencies.”67 I have argued previously that the
reasoning in Lingle applies with equal force to the Kelo Court’s concern
for pretext in the eminent domain context,68 and other scholars have
concurred.69 At the very least, the reasoning in Lingle powerfully
undermines Horton and Levesque’s argument that the Court should
embrace a generalized heightened rational basis review in every case
invoking the Public Use Clause to challenge the exercise of eminent
domain.
V. HEIGHTENED RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW, THE PUBLIC USE CLAUSE,
AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE
Of course, it is possible that Horton and Levesque’s proposal is a good
idea even if it isn’t supported by Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Kelo or
Id. at 537 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
Id. at 543–44.
65
Id. at 543 (emphasis omitted).
66
Id. at 544.
67
Id.
68
Blais, supra note 27, at 982–83.
69
Fennell, supra note 57, at 77 n.60.
63
64
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by the Court’s existing Public Use Clause cases or its heightened rational
basis review jurisprudence. However, careful scrutiny of their suggestion
that every exercise of eminent domain should be subject to heightened
rational basis review under a detailed ten-factor test70 reveals several ways
in which it causes more mischief than it prevents. First, the application of
heightened rational basis review to every governmental eminent domain
will likely flood the courts with takings cases, yet Horton and Levesque
offer no evidence or argument about the extent of the benefit they expect
from this dramatic increase in judicial oversight of state and local
government decision making. Second, the proposal sets out ten factors for
courts to consider in resolving Public Use Clause challenges without
providing any guidance as to how the factors should be weighed, especially
if they conflict. Finally, the avowed purpose of the proposed ten-factor
test—to differentiate between good eminent domain decisions and bad
ones71—would involve courts in a substantive review of the merits of
economic legislation in a manner inconsistent with the appropriate and
acceptable roles of the two branches.
Horton and Levesque’s proposal would permit (perhaps encourage)
landowners to raise a Public Use Clause challenge to every proposed
eminent domain project. Under the Court’s current Public Use Clause
jurisprudence, challenges to the exercise of eminent domain for the
construction of publicly owned infrastructure are destined to fail and
therefore unlikely to be brought.72 Similarly, under existing Public Use
Clause jurisprudence, the use of eminent domain for projects that would be
“used by the public” is clearly constitutional.73 But one of the primary
purposes of the Horton and Levesque proposal is to change that. As they
say, “a proposal for a public road may in fact more easily meet Kennedy’s
test than a private economic development plan.”74 Thus, countless
condemnations for uses that are currently well-established as public uses
would be vulnerable to legal challenge under Horton and Levesque’s
proposal, greatly increasing the case loads of state and federal courts. But
Horton & Levesque, supra note 2, at 1426–27.
Id.
72
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 497–99 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“Our cases have generally identified three categories of takings that comply with the public use
requirement . . . . First, the sovereign may transfer private property to public ownership—such as for a
road, a hospital, or a military base.”); Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 708 (1923)
(“[W]e conclude that these highways will . . . afford accommodation to the traveling public, and that
the taking of land for them is a taking for a public use authorized by the law[] . . . .”). Cf. Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34 (1954) (“We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting
the public purposes of community redevelopment projects.”).
73
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477 (“[I]t is equally clear that a State may transfer property from one private
party to another if future ‘use by the public’ is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation of land for a
railroad with common-carrier duties is a familiar example.”).
74
Horton & Levesque, supra note 2, at 1426.
70
71
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Horton and Levesque do not explain how this increase in cases will better
implement the Public Use Clause or safeguard constitutionally protected
property rights. They allude to a “public road or bridge to nowhere” and a
“publicly owned and operated boondoggle” as targets of their proposed
ten-factor test, but do not elaborate. Is the nation filled with public roads to
nowhere and publicly owned and operated boondoggles, built on the backs
of oppressed private property owners? If so, Horton and Levesque’s
proposal would benefit from the inclusion of examples of actual publicly
owned roads and bridges to nowhere or other public works boondoggles
that their ten-factor test would have identified and invalidated before they
were built. Without such examples, a reader is left wondering whether the
potential payoff of such a wholesale expansion of judicial review of state
and local decision-making would be worth the cost.
Moreover, once these multitudes of Public Use Clause cases get to
court, Horton and Levesque’s proposal offers courts little guidance in how
to resolve them. Horton and Levesque suggest that courts assess the
proposed eminent domain projects using the following ten factors:
(1) Will a public body own or operate the property? (2)
How specific is the stated use? (3) Is it reasonably possible
the stated use will actually succeed? (4) Is the stated use
clearly a pretext? (5) Does the public gain outweigh any
private gain? (6) Is there clearly improper favoritism? (7) Is
there clearly improper targeting of a disfavored group? (8) Is
the particular property in question on the periphery of the
project? (9) Is there a comprehensive plan that any private
developer must follow? (10) Were any private beneficiaries
known at the time of the vote to condemn?75
They do not, however, offer any guidance into how those factors should be
evaluated or weighed against one another.
In considering Horton and Levesque’s ten-factor test, I found it helpful
to regroup the factors based on the focus of each inquiry. It appears that
factors four, six, and seven would be outcome determinative. In fact, factor
four simply restates the holding in Kelo—both the majority opinion and
Kennedy’s concurrence agreed that the exercise of eminent domain for
purely pretexual purposes is unconstitutional under the Public Use
Clause.76 Similarly, by including the term “improper” within factors six
Id. at 1426–27.
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478 (“Nor would the City be allowed to take property under the mere pretext
of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit.”); Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“The determination that a rational-basis standard of review is appropriate does not,
however, alter the fact that transfers intended to confer benefits on particular, favored private entities,
with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, are forbidden by the Public Use Clause.”).
75
76
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and seven, these factors essentially become outcome determinative also.77
One presumes that government action involving “clearly improper
favoritism” or “clearly improper targeting of a disfavored group” is already
unlawful, unless Horton and Levesque are proposing a new concept of
improper specific to this area of the law.78 If so, the content of that concept
should be fleshed out.
That leaves seven factors to be considered in cases where one of the
three outcome determinative inquiries is not satisfied.79 We can further
categorize these seven factors into those aimed at identifying pretext and
those aimed at assessing the wisdom of the proposed condemnation.
Factors one, five, and ten appear to be aimed at identifying pretext,
whereas factors two, three, eight, and nine seem to be intended to evaluate
the merits of the governmental decision to use eminent domain for the
project in question.80
Nowhere in their article, however, do Horton and Leveque offer any
guidance on the appropriate weight to be given to any of these factors, or
on what a court should do if it determines that several of the factors
suggest contradictory outcomes. Nor does the article provide sufficient
theoretical justification for the ten-factor test to permit a thoughtful court
to discern the appropriate weights and resolutions for itself. For example,
consider a court faced with a Public Use Clause challenge to a proposed
condemnation. If none of the three outcome determinative factors are
satisfied, the court must evaluate the proposed eminent domain project
using the remaining seven factors. Imagine that after taking extensive
evidence the court concludes that: (1) the project will be owned by a public
body; (3) it is reasonably possible that the stated use will actually succeed;
(5) the private gain outweighs the public gain by a considerable margin but
the public gain is large; (8) the particular property in question is on the
periphery of the project; (9) there is a comprehensive plan for the project;
and (10) there were private beneficiaries known at the time of the vote to
condemn. These findings appear to cut in competing directions: the public
ownership, likelihood of success, and comprehensive plan indicate that the
project serves a public use, but the private gain, known private
Horton & Levesque, supra note 2, at 1426–27.
Alternatively, these two factors can be seen as similar to the triggers for heightened rational
basis review discussed above. But triggers are conceptually different from factors in a multi-factor test,
and Horton and Levesque’s inclusion of these triggers in their proposal as mere factors obfuscates
rather than clarifies current law.
79
Id. (including factors one, two, three, five, eight, nine, and ten). As noted above, under current
Public Use Clause jurisprudence if the project was to be owned by a public entity, this factor would
also be determinative. I include it in the remaining test because I understand Horton and Levesque to be
proposing to change the current law in this regard.
80
Of course, some of the factors might be relevant to both inquiries. For example, the existence of
a comprehensive plan could demonstrate the merits of a proposed project as well as decrease the
likelihood that the public use component was pretextual or incidental.
77
78
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beneficiaries, and peripheral nature of the property suggest that the
condemnation might be serving a private interest. But Horton and
Levesque offer no guidance to a court tasked with resolving a Public Use
Clause challenge in such a case. Indeed, Horton and Leveque offer a
similar example, drawn from the New London development plan at issue in
Kelo, by suggesting that some aspects of the plan could have been
different: “Suppose the owner was New London itself? Suppose the lease
was for twenty years? Suppose New London actually operated the
project?”81 They then assert that “the answer to these questions would be
relevant to a decision, but they should not be conclusive.”82 Nowhere,
however, do they explain why the answers would be relevant, why they
should not be conclusive, or even how they should be evaluated.
Takings jurisprudence, which already has a long and troubled
relationship with undertheorized multi-factored tests, will not benefit by
the addition of a longer, more multi-factored test. In the regulatory takings
context, land use regulations that interfere with a landowner’s use of her
property are evaluated under an “essentially ad-hoc, factual inquir[y]” that
employs three factors: (1) the character of the government action; (2) the
economic impact of the government action; and (3) the degree of
interference with distinct investment-backed expectations.83 Although this
test includes only three (not ten) factors, courts and commentators have
long lamented its indeterminacy and lack of coherence as a standard for
deciding when land use regulations constitute compensable takings.84
Horton and Leveque’s proposed ten-factor test, lacking in general
theoretical foundation and concrete practical guidance, threatens to bring
even more incoherence and indeterminacy to takings jurisprudence via the
Public Use Clause.
Finally, even if Horton and Levesque’s proposal could be implemented
to permit courts to make reasoned and consistent distinctions between good
Horton & Levesque, supra note 2, at 1427.
Id.
83
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
84
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 561, 561–62 (1984) (citations omitted) (“By far the most intractable constitutional
property issue is whether certain governmental actions ‘take’ property without satisfying the
constitutional requirements of due process and just compensation. A number of property theorists have
addressed this vexing issue, but they have yet to agree on the proper disposition. Instead, commentators
propose test after test to define ‘takings,’ while courts continue to reach ad hoc determinations rather
than principled resolutions.”); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1089 (1993) (citations
omitted) (“This confusion only worsened in 1978 with Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, in which the Court . . . foreswore the pursuit of general principles to resolve takings cases and
held that judges must instead engage in ‘essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.’ The Court’s results under
this ‘ad hoc’ approach easily earned the continuing admiration of commentators for the ‘disarray’ they
produced.”). But see Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 525, 529–30 (2009) (arguing that the “conceptual fuzziness” and “indeterminacy and imprecision”
of the Penn Central factors are inevitable and are an “explicitly realist solution” to difficult cases).
81
82

1514

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1497

eminent domain projects and bad ones, its adoption would be inconsistent
with the appropriate roles of legislative decision makers and courts. Courts
are particularly poorly suited to assess some of the factors included in
Horton and Levesque’s ten-factor test. For example, courts are ill-equipped
to decide whether a project is reasonably likely to succeed, and there is
certainly no reason to believe that a court’s determination of this issue
would be more accurate than that of state and local legislative decision
makers. Thus, requiring courts to attempt these assessments would likely
interfere with legitimate and important state and local projects. The Kelo
Court recognized these concerns when it expressly rejected judicial
oversight of the likelihood of a project’s success:
“When the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its means
are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates
over the wisdom of takings—no less than debates over the
wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation—are not
to be carried out in the federal courts . . . .” The
disadvantages of a heightened form of review are especially
pronounced in this type of case. Orderly implementation of a
comprehensive redevelopment plan obviously requires that
the legal rights of all interested parties be established before
new construction can be commenced. A constitutional rule
that required postponement of the judicial approval of every
condemnation until the likelihood of success of the plan had
been assured would unquestionably impose a significant
impediment to the successful consummation of many such
plans.85
Moreover, the basic premise of Horton and Levesque’s proposal—that
courts should sit as super legislatures to assess the wisdom or merits of
state and local economic decision-making—is inconsistent with the
legitimate judicial role. The Supreme Court has long recognized that courts
should not substitute their judgment about the wisdom of economic
legislation and regulation for that of elected legislatures or expert agencies
in challenges to those laws and policies. As the Court said in Heller v.
Doe:86
[R]ational-basis review in equal protection analysis “is not a
license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of
legislative choices” . . . . Nor does it authorize “the judiciary
[to] sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or
85
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488 (2005) (quoting Hawaii Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S 229, 242–43 (1984)).
86
509 U.S. 312 (1993).
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desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas
that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along
suspect lines.”87
A look at the Lingle holding is also instructive:
The [substantially advances] formula [proposed by Chevron]
can be read to demand heightened means-ends review of
virtually any regulation of private property. If so interpreted,
it would require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a vast
array of state and federal regulations—a task for which
courts are not well suited. Moreover, it would empower—
and might often require—courts to substitute their predictive
judgements [sic] for those of elected legislatures and expert
agencies.
. . . [W]e have long eschewed such heightened scrutiny when
addressing substantive due process challenges to government
regulation. The reasons for deference to legislative judgments
about the need for, and likely effectiveness of, regulatory
actions are by now well established . . . .88
Horton and Leveque’s proposal would upend this careful balance of
roles and responsibilities, and subject a vast array of legislative and
administrative policy decisions to judicial review under a sweeping tenfactor test that provides little guidance to the reviewing court.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ten years ago, Horton and Levesque prevailed in an important Public
Use Clause case that put to rest emerging calls for heightened scrutiny, or
outright banning, of a particular category of condemnation cases—those
motivated by economic development plans or involving transfers of the
condemned property to other private owners. In so doing, Horton and
Levesque helped the Supreme Court reaffirm the long-established wisdom
that public use is a broad concept encompassing anything that serves a
public purpose and that it is particularly within the province of legislative
decision makers to determine what projects will serve the public purpose.
By advocating the adoption and widespread application of a ten-factor
heightened rational basis review test for every exercise of the power of
eminent domain, Horton and Levesque threatened to forsake that victory
and upend the settled wisdom.

87
88

Id. at 319 (citations omitted).
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544–45 (2005).

